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Generating programs using large language models (LLMs) for fuzz testing has emerged as a significant testing methodology. While traditional fuzzers can produce correct programs, their effectiveness is limited by excessive constraints and restricted API combinations, resulting in insufficient coverage of the target system’s code and impacting testing efficiency. Unlike traditional methods, large language model based fuzzers can generate more diverse code, effectively addressing key issues of conventional fuzzers. However, the lack of constraints on API combinations during the generation process often leads to reduced program validity. Therefore, a crucial challenge is to enhance the validity of generated code while maintaining its diversity. To address this issue, we propose a novel and universal fuzzer, LMFuzz. To ensure the fuzzer’s generation capability, we utilize a large language model as the primary generator and model the operator selection problem within the fuzzing loop as a multi-armed bandit problem. We introduce the Thompson Sampling algorithm to enhance both the diversity and validity of program generation. To improve the validity of the generated code, we incorporate a program repair loop that iteratively corrects the generated programs, thereby reducing errors caused by the lack of API combination constraints. Experimental results demonstrate that LMFuzz significantly surpasses existing state-of-the-art large language model based fuzzers in terms of coverage and validity, and also exhibits notable advantages in generating diverse programs. Furthermore, LMFuzz has identified 24 bugs across five popular programming languages and their corresponding systems.

Mutation-based fuzzing is one of the most popular software testing techniques. After allocating a specific amount of energy (i.e., the number of testcases generated by the seed) for the seed, it uses existing mutation operators to continuously mutate the seed to generate new testcases and feed them into the target program to discover unexpected behaviors, such as bugs, crashes, and vulnerabilities. However, the random selection of mutation operators and sequential selection of mutation positions in existing fuzzers affect path discovery and bug detection. In this paper, a novel adaptive mutation schedule framework, AMSFuzz is proposed. For the random selection of mutation operators, AMSFuzz has the ability to adaptively adjust the probability distribution of mutation operators to select mutation operators. Aiming at the sequential selection of mutation positions, seeds are dynamically sliced with different sizes during the fuzzing process and giving more seeds the opportunity to preferentially mutate, improving the efficiency of fuzzing. AMSFuzz is implemented and evaluated in 12 real-world programs and LAVA-M dataset. The results show that AMSFuzz substantially outperforms state-of-the-art fuzzers in terms of path discovery and bug detection. Additionally, AMSFuzz has detected 17 previously unknown bugs in several projects, 15 of which were assigned CVE IDs.

Fuzzing is an automated software testing technique broadly adopted by the industry. A popular variant is mutation-based fuzzing, which discovers a large number of bugs in practice. While the research community has studied mutation-based fuzzing for years now, the algorithms' interactions within the fuzzer are highly complex and can, together with the randomness in every instance of a fuzzer, lead to unpredictable effects. Most efforts to improve this fragile interaction focused on optimizing seed scheduling. However, real-world results like Google's FuzzBench highlight that these approaches do not consistently show improvements in practice. Another approach to improve the fuzzing process algorithmically is optimizing mutation scheduling. Unfortunately, existing mutation scheduling approaches also failed to convince because of missing real-world improvements or too many user-controlled parameters whose configuration requires expert knowledge about the target program. This leaves the challenging problem of cleverly processing test cases and achieving a measurable improvement unsolved. We present DARWIN, a novel mutation scheduler and the first to show fuzzing improvements in a realistic scenario without the need to introduce additional user-configurable parameters, opening this approach to the broad fuzzing community. DARWIN uses an Evolution Strategy to systematically optimize and adapt the probability distribution of the mutation operators during fuzzing. We implemented a prototype based on the popular general-purpose fuzzer AFL. DARWIN significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art mutation scheduler and the AFL baseline in our own coverage experiment, in FuzzBench, and by finding 15 out of 21 bugs the fastest in the MAGMA benchmark. Finally, DARWIN found 20 unique bugs (including one novel bug), 66% more than AFL, in widely-used real-world applications.

Fuzzing has achieved tremendous success in discovering bugs and vulnerabilities in various software systems. Systems under test (SUTs) that take in programming or formal language as inputs, e.g., compilers, runtime engines, constraint solvers, and software libraries with accessible APIs, are especially important as they are fundamental building blocks of software development. However, existing fuzzers for such systems often target a specific language, and thus cannot be easily applied to other languages or even other versions of the same language. Moreover, the inputs generated by existing fuzzers are often limited to specific features of the input language, and thus can hardly reveal bugs related to other or new features. This paper presents Fuzz4All, the first fuzzer that is universal in the sense that it can target many different input languages and many different features of these languages. The key idea behind Fuzz4All is to leverage large language models (LLMs) as an input generation and mutation engine, which enables the approach to produce diverse and realistic inputs for any practically relevant language. To realize this potential, we present a novel autoprompting technique, which creates LLM prompts that are wellsuited for fuzzing, and a novel LLM-powered fuzzing loop, which iteratively updates the prompt to create new fuzzing inputs. We evaluate Fuzz4All on nine systems under test that take in six different languages (C, C++, Go, SMT2, Java and Python) as inputs. The evaluation shows, across all six languages, that universal fuzzing achieves higher coverage than existing, language-specific fuzzers. Furthermore, Fuzz4All has identified 98 bugs in widely used systems, such as GCC, Clang, Z3, CVC5, OpenJDK, and the Qiskit quantum computing platform, with 64 bugs already confirmed by developers as previously unknown.

Deep Learning (DL) library bugs affect downstream DL applications, emphasizing the need for reliable systems. Generating valid input programs for fuzzing DL libraries is challenging due to the need for satisfying both language syntax/semantics and constraints for constructing valid computational graphs. Recently, the TitanFuzz work demonstrates that modern Large Language Models (LLMs) can be directly leveraged to implicitly learn all the constraints to generate valid DL programs for fuzzing. However, LLMs tend to generate ordinary programs following similar patterns seen in their massive training corpora, while fuzzing favors unusual inputs that cover edge cases or are unlikely to be manually produced. To fill this gap, this paper proposes FuzzGPT, the first technique to prime LLMs to synthesize unusual programs for fuzzing. FuzzGPT is built on the well-known hypothesis that historical bug-triggering programs may include rare/valuable code ingredients important for bug finding. Traditional techniques leveraging such historical information require intensive human efforts to design dedicated generators and ensure the validity of generated programs. FuzzGPT demonstrates that this process can be fully automated via the intrinsic capabilities of LLMs (including fine-tuning and in-context learning), while being generalizable and applicable to challenging domains. While FuzzGPT can be applied with different LLMs, this paper focuses on the powerful GPT-style models: Codex and CodeGen. Moreover, FuzzGPT also shows the potential of directly leveraging the instruct-following capability of the recent ChatGPT for effective fuzzing. Evaluation on two popular DL libraries (PyTorch and TensorFlow) shows that FuzzGPT can substantially outperform TitanFuzz, detecting 76 bugs, with 49 already confirmed as previously unknown bugs, including 11 high-priority bugs or security vulnerabilities.

Fuzz testing is a vulnerability discovery technique that tests the robustness of target programs by providing them with unconventional data. With the rapid increase in software quantity, scale and complexity, traditional fuzzing has revealed issues such as incomplete logic coverage, low automation level and insufficient test cases. Machine learning, with its exceptional capabilities in data analysis and classification prediction, presents a promising approach for improve fuzzing. This paper investigates the latest research results in fuzzing and provides a systematic review of machine learning-based fuzzing techniques. Firstly, by outlining the workflow of fuzzing, it summarizes the optimization of different stages of fuzzing using machine learning. Specifically, it focuses on the application of machine learning in the preprocessing phase, test case generation phase, input selection phase and result analysis phase. Secondly, it mentally focuses on the optimization methods of machine learning in the process of mutation, generation and filtering of test cases and compares and analyzes its technical principles. Furthermore, it analyzes the performance gains brought by applying machine learning techniques to fuzzing, mainly including coverage, vulnerability detection capability, efficiency and effectiveness of test cases. Lastly, it concludes by summarizing the challenges and difficulties in combining machine learning with fuzzing and presents prospects for future trends in this field.

Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try guess the destination and attempt to execute ahead. When the memory value finally arrives, the CPU either discards or commits the speculative computation. Speculative logic is unfaithful in how it executes, can access to the victim's memory and registers, and can perform operations with measurable side effects. Spectre attacks involve inducing a victim to speculatively perform operations that would not occur during correct program execution and which leak the victim's confidential information via a side channel to the adversary. This paper describes practical attacks that combine methodology from side channel attacks, fault attacks, and return-oriented programming that can read arbitrary memory from the victim's process. More broadly, the paper shows that speculative execution implementations violate the security assumptions underpinning numerous software security mechanisms, including operating system process separation, static analysis, containerization, just-in-time (JIT) compilation, and countermeasures to cache timing/side-channel attacks. These attacks represent a serious threat to actual systems, since vulnerable speculative execution capabilities are found in microprocessors from Intel, AMD, and ARM that are used in billions of devices. While makeshift processor-specific countermeasures are possible in some cases, sound solutions will require fixes to processor designs as well as updates to instruction set architectures (ISAs) to give hardware architects and software developers a common understanding as to what computation state CPU implementations are (and are not) permitted to leak.

The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access. In this paper, we present Meltdown. Meltdown exploits side effects of out-of-order execution on modern processors to read arbitrary kernel-memory locations including personal data and passwords. Out-of-order execution is an indispensable performance feature and present in a wide range of modern processors. The attack works on different Intel microarchitectures since at least 2010 and potentially other processors are affected. The root cause of Meltdown is the hardware. The attack is independent of the operating system, and it does not rely on any software vulnerabilities. Meltdown breaks all security assumptions given by address space isolation as well as paravirtualized environments and, thus, every security mechanism building upon this foundation. On affected systems, Meltdown enables an adversary to read memory of other processes or virtual machines in the cloud without any permissions or privileges, affecting millions of customers and virtually every user of a personal computer. We show that the KAISER defense mechanism for KASLR has the important (but inadvertent) side effect of impeding Meltdown. We stress that KAISER must be deployed immediately to prevent large-scale exploitation of this severe information leakage.

We show that it is possible to write remote stack buffer overflow exploits without possessing a copy of the target binary or source code, against services that restart after a crash. This makes it possible to hack proprietary closed-binary services, or open-source servers manually compiled and installed from source where the binary remains unknown to the attacker. Traditional techniques are usually paired against a particular binary and distribution where the hacker knows the location of useful gadgets for Return Oriented Programming (ROP). Our Blind ROP (BROP) attack instead remotely finds enough ROP gadgets to perform a write system call and transfers the vulnerable binary over the network, after which an exploit can be completed using known techniques. This is accomplished by leaking a single bit of information based on whether a process crashed or not when given a particular input string. BROP requires a stack vulnerability and a service that restarts after a crash. We implemented Braille, a fully automated exploit that yielded a shell in under 4,000 requests (20 minutes) against a contemporary nginx vulnerability, yaSSL + MySQL, and a toy proprietary server written by a colleague. The attack works against modern 64-bit Linux with address space layout randomization (ASLR), no-execute page protection (NX) and stack canaries.